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Ulrich Trumpener through the diffusion of noxious vapors had actually been started much earlier in the war-both by the French and by the Germans themselves.
While no definitive assessment of French front-line experiments with gas munitions prior to April 22, 1915 is possible until all relevant files in the military archives of France have been opened, some tentative conclusions on this subject can be drawn now.5 To begin with, it is now beyond question that small gas-diffusing projectiles of prewar design and manufacture, so-called cartouches suffocantes, were used by French troops in some sectors of the Western front as early as 1914.6 Intended primarily for attacks on fortifications, these projectiles were filled with ethyl bromo-acetate (in liquid form), weighed approximately half a pound, and were launched by special twenty-six-caliber rifles (fusils lance-cartouches eclairantes).7 By February 1915, hand grenades containing the same chemical agent, but of greater weight and volume and thus more suitable for assaults on open trenches, had been added to the stock of French gas munitions, and there are strong indications that some of these grenades suffocantes were used against German troops in the Argonne sector from mid-March on.8
According to a confidential circular issued by the French war ministry on February 21, 1915, the vapors released by these two types of engins suffocants were "irritant" to the eyes, the nose, and the throat but, "at least in small dosage," not actually "deleterious."9 While this was certainly an accurate summary of the effect 5For an introduction to the historical controversy which erupted after World War I on the subject of French gas munitions, see the Swiss contribution by W. Volkart, "Der Giftgaskrieg und seine Entstehung," Allgemeine schweizerische Militarzeitung, no. 2 (1926), pp. 69-78. 6 This was confirmed by Colonel Hurbin, adjoint au chef du Service historique de l'armee, Vincennes, in a letter to the author, March 26, 1971. According to Colonel Hurbin, the grenades, as distinct from the less powerful cartouches suffocantes, were "not used" until after the Germans had staged their first chlorine attack. However, this information is hard to reconcile with the text of the "Notice . . ." and conflicts directly with German reports from the front in March and April which refer explicitly to French attacks with "hand grenades" or "bombs' of the gas-diffusing type. 9 See Ministere de la Guerre, "Notice ...," last section.
As for the "1914" models, it appears from German reports that, because of their limited size and volume, they rarely caused more than temporary discomfort (irritation of the eyes, a choking sensation, etc.) among troops who were attacked with these missiles. Nevertheless, the very use of such devices by one of the Allied armies from the fall of 1914 did set a precedent of sorts, making it psychologically easier for the Germans to try out their own, and far more potent, gas weapons at the earliest opportunity.
Just as in France and Britain (where the War Office had started tests with chemical "irritants"-chloracetone and benzyl chloridein the spring of 1914),12 some military experiments with chemical agents had been conducted in Germany before the outbreak of the war. However, according to an extant memorandum by Colonel Max Bauer-the well-known artillery specialist in the Prussian general staff who later, in 1916, became General Ludendorff's principal adviser on economic and political questions-the results of these German prewar tests had been "negative" throughout. Indeed, Bauer complained, not only was it necessary to start all over again during the war, "but the negative outcome of the experiments made before the war actually impeded the acceptance of the new results, ' On personal instructions from General von Falkenhayn, Max Bauer-who was then a major and chief of the Heavy Artillery and Fortresses section in the Operations Branch at the OHL-early in October 1914 convened a small group of scientists and army officers on the Wahn artillery range near Cologne. The assigned task of the committee, which included Walther Nernst (a future Nobel laureate) and the director-general of the Leverkusen Farbenfabriken, Carl Duisberg, was to develop a chemical shell-of the "incendiary, smoke, irritant, or stink" type-that could be used to drive enemy troops from house cellars and other inaccessible places. Apparently at the suggestion of one member who had previously served at the front, the committee eventually decided to try out a nontoxic sternutator, double salts of dianisidine, and recommended that the powdery substance be put into the standard shrapnels used by German field howitzers.15 Because of the still-existing bottlenecks in the German shell production program,22 Haber came up with the idea of releasing the chlorine from specially fitted containers in the German trenches and letting the wind push the gas into the opposing lines. Aside from the ready availability of industrial storage cylinders that could be adapted for that purpose, the "cloud gas" technique proposed by Haber offered the additional advantage that it could be used against those Allied positions which were too close to the German lines to permit their bombardment with high-explosive shells. 23 The most serious drawback of the whole system, as the Germans soon found out, was of course its complete dependence on suitable wind conditions.
On December 18, shortly after testing of the new T-shells had commenced on the Kummersdorf artillery range, General von Falkenhayn got in touch with Emil Fischer, a renowned chemist at the University of Berlin. According to Fischer's account of the meeting, Falkenhayn pointed out that the new Stinkstoffe were not altogether satisfactory in their effect, and that he wanted something which would incapacitate the enemy "permanently." Fischer (who apparently had never been consulted before) thereupon replied that it was very difficult to develop chemical agents which would produce a lethal effect, though he subsequently confided to Duisberg that he actually knew of a substance that was "very bad" indeed. However, since the "necessary raw materials" for its production were not available in Germany, he, Fischer, thought it best not to pursue the matter, particularly since the enemy might get wind of it and use the idea to his own advantage.24
About two weeks after Falkenhayn's meeting with Fischer, the first experiments with chlorine discharges from cylinders were carried out on the Wahn artillery range. However, for security reasons, no "large-scale" test was attempted; as General Tappen later put it, one could hardly afford to have the smell of chlorine spread out for miles and miles.25 On the basis of the preliminary test results, the OHL decided in mid-January to clear the new weapon for use at the 22 468 Ulrich Trumpener front, though its "unchivalrous nature," according to Tappen, was "initially repugnant" to everyone concerned . 26 At the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, many nations, including Germany, had formally agreed to a number of rules and limitations in the conduct of war. Among other things, they had pledged not to "employ poison or poisoned weapons," or "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering," or to make "use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases."27 By interpreting these clauses very literally, General von Falkenhayn and his advisers satisfied themselves that, quite apart from the "provocation" already offered by the French with their cartouches suffocantes, both the T-shells and the chlorine cloud gas were permissible weapons under the Hague Convention.28
As far as the prohibition of "poison or poisoned weapons" was concerned, the OHL took the position that this clause applied only to the deliberate poisoning of food or water, the use of missiles steeped in a poisonous substance, and the like, but that it clearly had no bearing on "gas" warfare, since the matter of "asphyxiating or deleterious gases" had been dealt with in an entirely separate agreement. The wording of that agreement, in turn, made it possible to maintain that the prohibition expressed therein did not apply to the particular gas weapons the OHL intended to use. The T-shells, at Falkenhayn's insistence, contained both a gas-producing compound and an explosive charge for fragmentation effect (hence they could be said to serve a dual purpose), while the release of chlorine gas from stationary cylinders did not involve "projectiles" at all. Finally, it could be and was argued that the new German gas weapons did not inflict "unnecessary" suffering on the enemy, since they were used solely to break, or at least reduce, his capacity for fight.29 Indeed, Haber both then and later took the position that 26 While the T-ammunition, upon its clearance by the OHL in mid-January 1915, was initially tried out against Russian troops, Falkenhayn and his advisers decided that the chlorine cloud gas system-code name "Disinfection"-should first be used on the Western front. According to later testimony by Gerhard Tappen, this choice was very much influenced by the OHL's intention at that time to seek a "decision" in the West before long, but all available evidence points to the conclusion that such grand strategic considerations were quickly lost sight of. Indeed, it is obvious from subsequent events and Tappen's own papers that the leading men at the OHL were doubtful from the start that the cloud gas system, requiring difficult and easily detectable preparations close to the enemy lines and depending completely on suitable weather conditions, could actually be used in a strategically decisive fashion. the forward trenches and embedding them there under a layer of earth had to be done mostly at night and was not completed until about March 10. To everyone's consternation, wind conditions in the area during the next two weeks either proved clearly unsuitable for a release of the gas into the opposing, British-held, lines or changed just before a scheduled attack was to get under way. As a result, the German troops in the sector were placed repeatedly on fruitless alerts. To make matters worse, several cylinders were punctured by enemy shells or bullets, causing a growing number of gas casualties among the unprotected infantrymen in the German trenches . 42 In view of the problems encountered in the Gheluvelt sector, Duke Albrecht of Wiirttemberg and his advisers at Fourth Army headquarters decided on March 25 that an alternate "gas front" should be prepared on the northern side of the Ypres salient. While most of the chlorine cylinders eventually used for that new front seem to have come from newly delivered stock, there are indications that some F batteries were also taken from the contingent originally assigned to the Gheluvelt area. In any event, it is clear that because of continued adverse wind conditions no gas was actually released in Deimling's sector until the beginning of May, that is, a full two months after the cylinders had first been readied for action there. 43 Both in Deimling's sector and later in the alternate gas front farther north, most German infantrymen, and their officers in particular, reacted to the arrival of the F batteries with distrust and displeasure. Their antipathy toward the eerie new weapon was soon heightened by occasional gas leakages from damaged cylinders in their own trenches and the additional work and danger to which they were subjected in assembling repeatedly for attacks which then had to be canceled because of adverse weather conditions.44 Misgivings about the new weapon were shared by several senior commanders in other parts of the Western front. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, whose Sixth Army was deployed immediately to the south of Duke Albrecht's sector, told both Falkenhayn and Haber that the impending cloud gas attacks in the Ypres region seemed to him not only distasteful but also militarily unsound. If the technique proved effective, the enemy would certainly adopt it too, and since the 42 prevailing winds on the Western front came from the west, the Allies would be able to blow off gas "against us ten times more often than we could" against them.45 Despite Falkenhayn's and Haber's reassuring reply that the chemical industry of the Allies ''was simply not capable of producing gas in the quantity needed," Rupprecht's concern did of course prove justified before long-by September the British were ready to stage a major cloud gas attack of their own, and Rupprecht's Sixth Army was in fact the first to be hit.46
Colonel-General Karl von Einem,47 who commanded the Third Army in the Champagne, was similarly unhappy about the introduction of the new weapon. "I fear it will produce a tremendous scandal in the world," he wrote to his wife shortly after he had heard about the first gas attack at Ypres. Though the Allies "supposedly cannot imitate the device, I presume nonetheless that they will soon have something similarly diabolical. . . . War has nothing to do with chivalry any more. The higher civilization rises, the viler man becomes."48 Two years later, after both sides had introduced ever more toxic gases on the battlefield, Einem would express himself even more strongly about Falkenhayn's initiative in using such an "unchivalrous" weapon which was "repugnant to me from the very start." "Now our enemies have it too, and many a good man on our side has died a hero's death from poison."49 On April 2, 1915-over four weeks after the first chlorine cylinders had been placed in the German trenches in the Gheluvelt sector-a large-scale test of the F batteries behind the front was at long last undertaken. In the course of the experiment, which was conducted on the Beverloo troop training grounds in eastern Bel- 45 impending operation was to seize the "ridge along the road Boezinge-Pilckem-Langemarck-Poelcappelle," following which all units were to "dig in immediately and establish mutually covering strong points."54 Eight days later, Hiigel cautioned his two division commanders that the effect of the cloud gas might prove insufficient to get the German infantry to the Pilckem heights without great losses; if so, the attack was to be halted and everyone was to dig in until the enemy's resistance had been softened up further by a bombardment with T-shells.55
On April 10, that is, shortly before the placement of chlorine cylinders in the Steenstraat-Poelcappelle sector had been completed, Falkenhayn summoned General Ilse to his headquarters and impressed upon him that the gas attack should be carried out as soon as possible, since the Twenty-sixth Reserve Corps and several other units in the Ypres region might soon be needed elsewhere. Faced with this pressure from the OHL, Fourth Army command ordered that the gas attack be launched on April 15, but a complete lack of wind on the morning of that day once again, as in the Gheluvelt sector before, made it necessary to cancel the operation.56
In view of the tense situation on the Eastern front, where the Austro-Hungarian ally was under mounting Russian pressure in the Carpathians, General von Falkenhayn had meanwhile arrived at a rather drastic change of plans. Whereas it had hitherto been intended to use Germany's newly created strategic reserves either in France or in Belgium, he now decided to transfer at least eight divisions to Galicia for a major strike against the Russians in the Gorlice- Tarnow remote than they had been previously, both Falkenhayn and Tappen insisted that the gas fronts prepared by the Fourth Army be activated as soon as possible. According to Falkenhayn's memoirs, continued German activity along the Western front was necessary to screen the troop transfers to Galicia, and the Ypres operation was therefore quite useful.59 Moreover, according to Tappen's testimony, it was felt that the hoped-for elimination of the Ypres salient was worthwhile in itself, in terms both of shortening the front and of seizing an area which had been fought over so "ardently" in the fall of 1914.60 On April 21, one day after a second attempt to activate the gas front in the Steenstraat-Poelcappelle sector had had to be canceled because of a lack of wind, Falkenhayn and Tappen 67 The effectiveness of the cloud gas in opening a hole in the French lines and the ensuing rapid advances by some of Hiigel's and Kathen's troops initially produced considerable excitement at German general headquarters. The Kaiser, when he heard of the success the next day, embraced Falkenhayn three times and promised Colonel Tappen a bottle of pink champagne. His enthusiasm would probably have been less pronounced had he known that no sig-nificant reserves were left in the Ypres area to exploit the initial tactical success, and that all further offensive thrusts would have to be improvised. 68 The lack of systematic planning became evident already on April 23. It was only late in the morning that specific directives concerning the continuation of the offensive were issued by Fourth Army command. While Hiigel's corps was instructed to push on southward toward Ypres, General von Kathen was given some reinforcements and told to advance "in the direction of" Poperinghe, a town west of Ypres which lay over ten kilometers behind the salient. Duke Albrecht's and General Ilse's apparent intention to send a major part of Kathen's corps farther toward the west immediately aroused the misgivings of the OHL, and a hasty reminder was sent to the Fourth Army that for the time being the operation should be aimed solely at "pinching off" the remainder of the Ypres salient.69
But by now even this more modest goal could no longer be attained without a severe struggle, for Allied efforts to seal off the holes in their lines had already progressed too far and Allied counterattacks were mounting in strength. Although the German line of attack was progressively broadened toward the south during the following days, the whole operation quickly turned into a typical battle of attrition. A small-scale discharge of chlorine cloud gas early on April 24 against Canadian-held positions near Saint-Julien pushed back but failed to crush the defenders (who had meanwhile been issued makeshift respirators),70 and even though a series of further cloud gas discharges was staged in the early part of May, practically all further gains of ground by the Germans were achieved at an increasing cost to themselves. When the offensive in most parts of the salient finally ground to a halt in the second week of May, Ypres and its immediate environs were still in Allied hands and the German casualty rate had climbed to a total of over 35,000 men.71
Although the total losses of the British Empire troops and of the French and Belgian units in the Ypres region were even higher, and although the Allies' long-standing plans and preparations for a great "Spring Offensive" in Artois were seriously disrupted by the German onslaught in the Flanders sector,72 the "premature" disclosure of the cloud gas technique for such a "paltry prize" has often been interpreted as a major blunder on the part of the German high command. 73 It is now clear, however, that General von Falkenhayn and his advisers at the OHL "wasted" the new weapon on a local operation with limited goals not so much because they were "scientifically hidebound" and muddleheaded, but because they had justifiable doubts that a large-scale offensive based on prior cloud gas discharges could actually be prepared with the necessary degree of secrecy. While it was difficult enough to conceal the installation of thousands of bulky gas cylinders in the forward German trenches, the leading men at the OHL were even more concerned about the likely prospect that the masses of troops needed for any kind of major offensive might have to wait in their jump-off positions for weeks on end before suitable wind conditions for a cloud gas discharge materialized.74 It was this specter of perpetual delays, and the attendant risk that the enemy would discover the buildup of forces against him, which induced Falkenhayn and his staff in mid-April to prepare the great German-Austrian strike against the Russians in the Gorlice-Tarnow area with conventional weapons only75 -a decision which would be fully vindicated by the smashing success of that offensive early the next month.76
As for the traditional commemoration of April 22, 1915, as the birthday of modern chemical warfare, that designation is obviously quite misleading. Attempts to break the resistance of enemy soldiers by chemical "irritants" had been made on both the Eastern and Western fronts long before that day. What happened at Ypres was thus not an abrupt departure from all existing norms and practices but rather the escalation of a combat technique which had been used before, albeit ineffectually. The "success" of the German gas attack at Ypres, it should be emphasized, was only in part attributable to the fact that chlorine gas was more harmful in its effect on the human organism than the irritant vapors previously tried by Germans and French alike. Far more important was the quantitative dimension of the operation, that is, the enormous volume of gas that was effectively diffused on that day. In fact, it was above all the high concentration of gas over a wide area (something which the French had never tried and the Germans had never achieved before) which made the attack of April 22 militarily "effective"-in terms both of incapacitating a large number of enemy soldiers and of killing some of them for good measure.77 In the course of the next three years, Germans and Allies alike were to introduce ever more toxic chemical agents on the battlefield and to use them on a truly gigantic scale; but thanks to the rapid development and continuous improvement of face masks and other protective devices, only a few gas attacks of this later period would have quite the same impact as the one that opened the "Second Battle of Ypres."78 7While the German chemical warfare experts were well aware that chlorine gas could be made even more "effective" by mixing it with phosgene, the use of that highly toxic pulmonary irritant was initially deemed too provocative, and the Ypres cloud gas discharges on April 22 and 24 were therefore staged with chlorine only. This restraint, however, was soon abandoned. In the first cylinder attack on the Russian front, on May 31, a phosgene "supplement" (Zusatz) of "about 5 percent" was used along with the chlorine, and the death rate in the gassed Russian trenches was accordingly much higher. See Heber, "Gasangriffe . . . ," pp. 
